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11 Introduction
The paper aims at characterizing the optimal tax policy and the optimal quality of day care
services in an OLG model where parental choices over child care arrangements (that is, parental
time devoted to children and time spent in day care centers) aect in a type-specic way the
probability that a child grows up as a high-market-ability adult.
The role of child care for children's human capital acquisition has been widely studied
in the psychology and sociology literature. Economists have more recently recognized the
importance of child care on skills' acquisition. This is documented by two recent strands of
the literature. The rst one describes the individual's skill formation (see Cunha et al. 2005
for a review) as a dynamic process, characterized by strong complementarities between early
and late investments in human capital (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Cunha and Heckman
2007; Carneiro et al. 2007). As there are critical and sensitive periods for the development of
both cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, later remediation for early decits in the formation
of some important abilities is dicult and costly. A second strand of the literature looks at
the importance of parental time, and especially maternal time, vs. other types of child care
in producing children abilities. The earlier contributions - as surveyed for instance by Ruhm
(2004) - reached mixed conclusions. More recent contributions, see for instance Bernal (2008)
and Bernal and Keane (2009, 2010) highlight that, on average, the substitution of maternal
time with other child care sources produces negative and rather sizable eects on children skills.
However, they also show that this result masks some dierences across alternative sources of
child care and levels of maternal education: for instance, formal care (i.e. center-based care
and preschool) may have positive eects on children of poorly educated mothers.1 This is
also documented in Heckman and Masterov (2007) who review the evidence supporting the
idea that high quality preschool centers available to disadvantaged children on a voluntary
basis are highly eective in promoting achievement. The indications of this literature do
therefore support the appropriateness of including child care in the skill formation process and
of allowing for a type-specic impact of parental time and day care on the accumulation of
human capital.
In our model parents derive utility from their own consumption, leisure, time spent with
their kids and from the kids' human capital (warm-glow component). The warm-glow assump-
tion is consistent with altruism  a la Andreoni (1989) and it is often used in papers focusing
on the intergenerational transmission of human capital.2 We assume that agents are hetero-
geneous in two dimensions: market ability and ability to raise children. Both abilities can
1 Havnes and Mogstad (2010) show that the focus on mean impact of day care services on child development
can also mask important dierences along the earnings distribution. The eects are positive and sizable below
the median of the earnings distribution.
2 We are not alone in adopting warm-glow preferences: many papers on the intergenerational transmission of
human capital and wealth share this assumption (inter alia, see Glomm and Ravikumar 1992; Galor and Zeira
1993; Glomm and Kaganovich 2003, 2008; Cremer and Pestieau 2006). Though the empirical investigation of
motives for transfers is not conclusive, the warm-glow of giving seems to be important in motivating agents'
actions towards others (see Schokkaert 2006 for an exhaustive survey).
2be either high or low. By ability to raise children we mean the ability to transfer cognitive
and non-cognitive skills which are valuable on the market, for a given amount of time spent
with the children. The distribution of market ability/human capital across individuals is en-
dogenous, that is, it depends on parental choices over child care, while the distribution of the
ability to raise children is assumed to be exogenous. Moreover, we assume that the human
capital transmission is type-specic, in the sense that the eect of child care arrangements
on the probability for a child to become a high-market-ability adult depends on the parent's
type. We consider two dierent scenarios: rst, one where the government can use linear tax-
ation on labor income and a linear tax/subsidy on the purchase of day care services. Second,
a set-up where the government can resort to nonlinear taxation of labor income and again
a linear tax/subsidy on day care. In this case, to sidestep the complexities associated with
multi-dimensional screening, we simplify our set-up and assume that there is perfect correla-
tion between the two types of ability. We therefore move from a four- to a two-type model. A
high (low) market ability type will in this case also have a high (low) ability to raise children.
Under this circumstance we will focus on the case where children of low skilled individuals
benet from day care (that is, day care increases their probability of becoming high skilled),
while children of high skilled individuals have their probability of being high skilled tomorrow
reduced, by the substitution of parental time with day care.3 In both frameworks, we discuss
the rules dictating the optimal choice of day care quality enforced by the government.
With respect to previous contributions, we nd that optimal tax formulas incorporate type-
specic Pigouvian terms which correct for the intergenerational externality in human capital
accumulation. Indeed, the warm-glow assumption delivers an ineciency in the human capital
formation process as parents do not fully internalize the eects of their time devoted to child
care on the utility of their osprings. This ineciency calls for policy correction. The direc-
tion of this correction should ideally be type-specic, as the productivity of parental time in
producing market skills depends on the parent's type. When only linear instruments are avail-
able to the government, the tax rates need to be the same across skill types. For this reason,
the new term in the optimal tax formulas has to average the adjustments ideally required to
correct the behavior of the four types of agents. When a nonlinear tax on labor income is at
the government's disposal, the government can let agents face type-specic marginal income
tax rates. This is helpful since it allows the government to better tailor the distortion imposed
on each agent to the externality that he generates.
We also nd that the so called \principle of targeting" fails to hold in our model. This
principle states that a distortion is best addressed by the instrument that acts directly on the
relevant margin. In our setting it is the tax imposed on the purchases of day care services
that can be interpreted as the direct instrument to correct the agents' behavior. Therefore,
according to the principle of targeting, only the tax formula for this policy instrument should
be modied for corrective purposes. However, as we will see, all the tax formulas are aected.
Intuitively, this happens because, whereas the required correction to the behavior of parents
3 This assumption is further discussed in Section 4.
3is type-specic, the tax rate on day care purchases is restricted to be linear and therefore
uniform across types.
As far as the optimal choice of the quality of day care is concerned, this is determined by
equating the total private marginal benets of a quality increase to the marginal cost adjusted
for the presence of three additional terms: the rst one captures the impact on the government's
budget constraint through the change in demand of consumption and day care services. The
second one reects the intergenerational externality in human capital accumulation. The third
one, which is present only in the mixed tax system, comes from the self-selection constraint.
Both in the determination of the optimal tax formulas and of the optimal quality of day
care we allow for a merit good term which accounts for the possibility that the government
preferences deviate from the individual ones, that is, we allow for the government to disregard
the warm-glow component of individual utility as done, for instance, in Cremer and Pestieau
(2006). They analyze the optimal tax policy in a dynamic OLG model where the probability of
a child to be skilled is aected by education expenditures of parents motivated by warm-glow
altruism. The crucial dierence is that, in our framework, the way parents' choices aect the
level of human capital of the respective ospring depends on the parents' skills in a type-
specic way. As argued above, this assumption has important implications for the design of
the optimal tax system.
Admittedly, the inclusion of day care services into a second-best optimal taxation frame-
work is not a novelty of our analysis (see e.g. Cremer and Gahvari 1997, Blomquist et al.
2010 and Blomquist and Micheletto 2009). However, when the optimal taxation literature
discusses day care services, it typically does so by treating them just as one prominent ex-
ample of goods/services that are complements to labor. As such, it has been suggested that
their consumption should be encouraged by the tax system, or that they should be publicly
provided, in order to either mitigate the distortion against labor supply determined by income
taxation or to soften self-selection constraints in models of nonlinear income taxation. This
way of looking at day care services is however, in our opinion, limited. To view them simply
as an example of a complementary to labor item in the agents' consumption bundle prevents
from recognizing other important roles which day care can play and which can be relevant for
policy conclusions. Under this respect, our paper contributes to the existing optimal taxation
literature by trying to incorporate into the model this previously neglected aspect of day care
services. Child care enters the human capital production function in Casarico and Sommacal
(2011) which studies the impact on growth of changes in labor income taxation. However,
their analysis is not concerned with the design of optimal public policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients of the model
and provides a description of the behavior of agents, the productive technology, the evolution
over time of the skill distribution in the population and the government's objective function.
Section 3 analyzes the solution to the government's problem under a linear tax system, whereas
a mixed tax system is considered in Section 4. Section 5 discusses some possible extensions
of our model and Section 6 provides a numerical example aimed at illustrating the magnitude
4of the welfare loss from designing the public policy without taking into account the eects of
parental time on children's future human capital. Finally, Section 7 oers concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 The consumers
We consider a two-period OLG model with bi-dimensional intragenerational heterogeneity:
agents dier in their market ability, that is, in their human capital, and in their ability to
raise children. By ability to raise children we mean the ability to transfer human capital for
a given amount of time spent with the children. While the distribution of human capital is
endogenous and it depends on child care arrangements in a way which will be specied below,
the distribution of the ability to raise children is assumed to be exogenous. In the rst period
agents (children) do not take any active choice; depending on child care arrangements, on the
human capital of their parents and on the ability of parents to raise children, they have a
certain probability to have a high or a low level of human capital. In the second period, each
agent has a child and, given his level of skills, he decides how to allocate time between labor,
time devoted to children and leisure. Denoting time indices by a subscript, a parent of market
ability type j and ability to raise children type k (hereafter labelled simply as parent of ability
type jk) maximizes the following expected utility function:
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t respectively consumption, leisure time
without kids and leisure time spent with kids by a jk-agent. The term (Hj) reects the
warm-glow altruism of parents (Andreoni 1989) towards the level of market ability of their
children Hj, j = 1;2; with H2 > H1 and 0 () > 0. As regards the ability to raise children,
we assume that it can only take two possible values, low and high, respectively denoted by
k = 1 and k = 2.4 Parents with high (resp.: low) ability to raise children have, other things
being equal, a higher (resp.: lower) probability to raise a child who will become a high market
ability adult. jk(n
jk
t ) is the probability of having a high-human capital child and it stands
for k(n
jk
t ;Hj;et): the probability of being a high human capital agent is a function of the
parents' type jk, the time n
jk
t parents dedicate to child care and the quality of day care services
et; which individuals take as given and which we treat as a choice variable for the government.














4 Given that, by assumption, the ability to raise children is exogenous and constant over time, we simply
denote it via the superscript k rather than introducing a further variable.
5with l
jk
t indicating the labor supply, d
jk
t the time spent in day care centers and with a  1
indicating the care time required by each child. Hereafter we will assume for the sake of
exposition that a = 1.
We assume that for any given nt the following condition holds: 11
n (nt) < 
jk
n (nt) < 22
n (nt),
(or, equivalently given the time constraint (3), 22
d (dt) < 
jk
d (dt) < 11
d (dt)), with j 6= k. These
inequalities imply that an increase in the time spent with children by an agent who has low
ability to raise children and low market ability is less benecial for the child's probability of
becoming a high-market-ability adult than the time spent with children by an agent who has
high ability both at home and on the market. The productivity of the time devoted to kids
by an agent of type 12 and 21 is intermediate when compared to a type 11 and a type 22.
2.2 Output



















where fjk is the fraction of people of type jk and A > 0 is a parameter. Total population is
normalized to 1 and the population growth rate is equal to 0.
2.3 Evolution of skills' distribution
The dynamics of the fraction of high market ability people is described by the following linear
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Notice that by f2
t+1 and f1
t+1 we denote the fraction of high and low market ability indi-






t+1. We assume that the proportion of





t+1 are constant over time. This assumption, along with equations
(5) and (6), determines f
jk
t for any j;k and t.
2.4 Government
































6where  is the social planner discount factor. The parameter " 2 [0;1] allows the government to
launder out the warm-glow component.5 When " = 1, the government fully takes into account
the individual preferences; when " = 0, the government fully launders out the warm-glow
component.
As to the government's budget constraint, we have to distinguish between the case of a
linear tax system and the case of a mixed tax system.
3 Linear tax system
A linear tax system is dened as a system where commodity purchases are taxed according to
a set of dierentiated proportional taxes and earned income is taxed according to a linear tax
(consisting of a uniform marginal income tax rate plus a demogrant). Since labor is the only
source of income and a uniform tax on all commodities is equivalent to a proportional tax on
labor income, a linear tax system can be equivalently dened as a system where agents receive
(pay) a uniform lump-sum subsidy (tax) and commodity purchases are taxed according to a










t + Gt; (8)
where the price of consumption is normalized to 1, p(et) is the producer price of good dt, et
represents the quality of day care services which is taken as given by the individuals, w is the
wage in eciency units, Gt denotes a lump-sum transfer/tax, and 
x
t (with x = c;d) denotes
the tax/subsidy on good x.
The budget constraint for the government, which we assume to be balanced year by year





















t = Gt: (9)
3.1 Solution to the consumer optimization problem and indirect utility
function
The maximization of (1) subject to (2), (3) and (8) delivers the following rst order conditions
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5 How the warm-glow component should factor into social welfare calculations is a philosophical question as
much as it is an economic one. According to Hammond (1987), Andreoni (2006) and Diamond (2006), all social
welfare prescriptions should be made without counting warm-glow, but should be constrained by behavior that
is dictated by seeking warm-glow. For a contrasting view, see Kaplow (1998, 1995).
7where u0
yt = @u
@yt and where {
jk
t is the Lagrangian multiplier which denotes the marginal utility
of income for an agent of type jk at time t.
We dene V
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t are dened by the rst order con-
ditions (10), (11), (12) and by the time constraints (2) and (3).









































































with respect to x
t , Gt and et, where t and t are the multipliers of the constraints (9) and
(5).
We begin our analysis of the optimal policy by characterizing the optimal tax structure.
For this purpose it is convenient to introduce the concept of net marginal social evaluation of
an agent's income. Denoting by b
jk
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
: (14)
The rst term captures the impact that a change in income determined by the lump-sum
transfer has on the individual indirect utility function. The second and third terms indicate
the impact on the tax revenues associated with the change in the demand for the two goods.
The fourth term shows the impact that a change in the lump-sum transfer has on the demand
for day care and therefore on the probability for agent jk of having a high-market-ability child.
If " = 1, the social evaluation of turning a low-market ability into a high-market ability is given
by t. When " 6= 1, the social evaluation will also depend on the degree of laundering out.
We are now ready to characterize the optimal tax structure.
Proposition 1 Denoting Hicksian demands by a \tilde", and the expectation and covariance
operators respectively by E () and Cov (), the optimal linear tax system is characterized by
the following set of conditions:
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t

;
for x = c;d.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Condition (15) denes the optimal level of the uniform lump-sum transfer and has a stan-
dard interpretation. It requires that at an optimum the lump-sum transfer should be adjusted
such that b, the government's net marginal valuation of a transfer of 1$ (measured in terms of
government's revenue), should on average be equal to its marginal cost.
Condition (16) characterizes the optimal tax rates. On the left hand side we have the
proportional change in the aggregate compensated demand for good x due to indirect taxes.
This is determined by two terms. The rst term on the right hand side is entirely standard






xt ), the lower
should be the reduction of the consumption of good x due to the tax system. The second
one is the new term stemming from the impact that child care arrangements have on human
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, depends on whether the government
takes into account fully (" = 1), partially (0 < " < 1) or not at all (" = 0) the warm-glow com-

















identies the externality related to the assumption of impure altruism. Notice that these two
terms always push in the opposite direction provided that " 6= 1. As to the sign of the over-
all correction, notice that the tax instruments available to the government are linear, which
implies that the tax rates applied to the two goods need to be the same across individuals,
irrespective of the market ability and of the ability to raise children. For this reason, tax rates
have to average the adjustments ideally required to correct the behavior of the four types
of agents. Here the sign of @jk=@d
jk
t becomes relevant. If we assume that @11=@d11
t > 0
while @22=@d22
t < 0,6 the correction ideally imposed on these two types is of opposite sign.
Thus, if we consider for example the case of " = 1, we will have that the adjustment ideally
required to correct the time allocation of a parent of type 11 (resp.: 22) would call for not dis-
couraging (resp.: not encouraging) the consumption of day care services and of their Hicksian
complements.
If intuition leads quite naturally to assume that @11=@d11
t > 0 and @22=@d22
t < 0, it
is harder to make assumptions on the sign of the other derivatives, namely @jk=@d
jk
t when
6 This appears a quite natural assumption if one agrees that the quality of day care services cannot be lower
than that provided at home by parents of type 11 and it cannot be higher than that provided at home by
parents of type 22.
9j 6= k. It seems reasonable to believe that the sign of the derivative will in these cases crucially
depend on the value of time spent in day care centers d (and therefore on the number of hours
spent by the parent with the child) at which it is evaluated. Specically, it seems reasonable
to assume that the sign of the derivative is positive for low values of d (high values of n) and
it becomes negative for values of d exceeding (values of n below) a given threshold, which
will in general be dierent for parents of type 12 and parents of type 21.7 For this reason,
we avoid making specic assumptions on the sign of @jk=@d
jk
t for j 6= k. Depending on the
sign taken by each of these derivatives, the formula characterizing the tax rate on good x will
incorporate terms referring to agents of type jk, with j 6= k, pushing either in the direction
of encouraging or in the direction of discouraging the consumption of good x. Notice that the
weight of each of these terms will depend on how strong the eect of the tax rate is on the
compensated demand for day care services of the dierent agents' types.
We now turn our attention to how the quality of day care services should be chosen.
Proposition 2 provides the main result.










































































Proof. See Appendix A.
The left-hand side evaluates the eect on the agents' utilities of a marginal increase in the
quality of day care services. For each type of agent, it is given by the dierence between the
eect on utility (keeping constant the consumer price p(et)+d
t ) and the eect on the agents'
monetary outlays, keeping constant the demand for day care services. The rst term on the
right hand side measures the impact on tax revenues of a higher quality of day care. The
second term takes into account that a change in quality inuences the probability of becoming











The implied correction depends, as above, on the presence or absence of laundering out in
the social welfare function, and on the intergenerational externality stemming from impure
altruism.
7 We do not deny that a similar pattern might also hold for agents of type 11 and 22. What we have in
mind is that for agents of type 11 the derivative of 
11 with respect to d
11 becomes negative for values of d
11
which are so large that they cannot prevail at a social optimum; similarly, for agents of type 22 we admit the
theoretical possibility that the derivative of 
22 with respect to d
22 is positive but we implicitly assume that
this can only happen for values of d
22 which are so small that they cannot be compatible with their labor supply
at a social optimum.
10Having completed the analysis of the public policy under linear tax instruments, we devote
the next section to investigate the government's problem under the assumption that earned
income can be taxed on a nonlinear scale.
4 Mixed tax system
In this section we let the government optimize the design of a tax structure where earned
income is subject to a nonlinear income tax whereas the purchase of goods/services is subject
to a set of dierentiated linear commodity taxes.
Given that the choice of the optimal commodity tax structure boils down in our two-good
model to the choice of the optimal tax rate on expenses for day care services, we can safely
skip superscripts and denote by t the commodity tax (or subsidy) that applies at time t to
day care services.
With the government being able to observe earned income at an individual level but unable
to observe an individual's labor supply and his wage rate, the tax design problem is constrained
by a set of self-selection constraints. These constraints require that each agent must prefer
the point on the income tax schedule intended for his type rather than misrepresent his true
ability type and choose a point intended for some other types. An agent misrepresenting his
ability type is called a mimicker. To avoid dealing with the well-known complexities related to
multidimensional screening problems, in this section we assume perfect correlation between the
two types of abilities, i.e. market ability and ability to raise children. Under this assumption,
we have a two-type model where the population is divided between agents of type 11 and agents
of type 22. Since there are no longer agents of type jk, with j 6= k, we can safely simplify the
notation and use a single index to distinguish between dierent agents. Thus, we will hereafter











the net income of agent j, the government's problem can
be equivalently stated as the problem of oering at each time t two dierent bundles in the
(Y;B)-space, one for the high-skilled and one for the low-skilled, subject to a public budget
constraint and a set of self-selection constraints. Following the bulk of the literature, we focus
on the so-called normal case where the only binding self-selection constraint is the one ruling
out the possibility that high-skilled agents mimic low-skilled ones.
Denoting by V
j
t the maximum utility that can be attained by a type j agent who chooses
the (Y;B)-bundle intended for him by the government, and by b V 2
t the maximum utility that
11can be attained by a high ability mimicker, we have (remembering that d
j
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As we have done in the previous section, we begin by characterizing the optimal tax
structure and then move to the analysis of the optimal quality of day care services.
4.1 The optimal tax structure
As a measure of the distortions imposed by an optimal tax structure on the agents' labor
supply we will focus here on the concept of marginal eective tax rate (METR). This is
dened as the variation in total (income and commodity) taxes paid by an agent if he were
to earn an additional unit of gross income. Formally, the marginal eective tax rate faced by
agents of type i (i = 1;2) is dened as:
METRi

























denotes the marginal income tax rate faced by agents of type i.








subject to the link between
pre-tax earnings and post-tax earnings available for goods expenditures implied by the direct















= 0. This allows dening


















Thus, we can rewrite (19) as:
12METRi



























































































We are now ready to provide the following result.





















































































Proof. See Appendix B.
Starting with (22), the sign of @j=@n
j
t could in general be either positive or negative.
However, since (22) refers to agents who possess both high market ability and high ability to
raise children, we regard the case when @2=@n2
t > 0 as more relevant. If this is the case, and







t =0 < 0 (since additional time devoted to
working implies that the total amount of time that can be allocated to z and n goes down),
the sign of (22) is the opposite of the sign of the term within square brackets.
When the government respects the individuals' preferences, so that " = 1, the METR
faced by the high skilled agents is therefore positive, implying that the overall eect of the tax
system is to induce high-skilled agents to under-provide labor supply in order to spend more
time with their children. This is required in order to induce the high-skilled adults at time
t to internalize the social welfare eect generated by the link between their time allocation
decision and the proportion of high-skilled adults at time t + 1. Spending more time with
their children, the high-skilled agents raise the probability that, growing up, their children will
become high-skilled adults.
If however the government launders, fully (" = 0) or partially (0 < " < 1), the individuals'
preferences into the social welfare function, one cannot rule out the possibility that the METR
faced by the high-skilled agents turns out to be negative. The reason is that, as " becomes
smaller, the need to provide high-skilled agents with incentives to spend more time with their
children is weakened given that, from the government's point of view, high-skilled agents
overvalue the utility that they get from spending time with their children. As " approaches
zero, this eect might become so strong that, even if additional time spent by high-skilled
parents with their children raises the probability that they become high-skilled adults, from
a social point of view parents appear to be over-investing in time spent with their children.
13To correct for this, a negative marginal eective tax rate on high-skilled agents might be
warranted as an indirect instrument to induce agents to work more and reduce total time
spent with their children.
Consider now (23), which provides an expression for the METR faced by low-skilled agents
at an optimum. The second term on the right hand side of (23) has the same structure as
the term appearing on the right hand side of (22) and it can be interpreted in a similar way.
However, since (23) refers to agents who possess both low market ability and low ability to
raise children, in this case we regard the case when @1=@n1
t < 0 as more relevant.8 Thus,
the sign of the second term on the right hand side of (23) is the same as the sign of the
expression within square brackets. In particular, when the government respects the agents'
preferences and chooses " = 1, the second term on the right hand side of (23) tends to reduce
the marginal eective tax rate faced by low-skilled agents. This represents a way to induce
low-skilled agents to work more and substitute consumption for leisure time and for time with
the children. Being unable to directly control the amount of time that parents devote to their
children, the government aects the agents' incentives to engage in labor market activities in
order to inuence the time they spend with their children and let them internalize the social
welfare eect generated by the link between their time allocation decision and the proportion
of high-skilled adults at time t+1. If however the government launders the agents' preferences
in the social welfare function and chooses 0  " < 1, the sign of the second term on the right
hand side of (23) might change from negative to positive, reecting the fact that, from the
perspective of the government, low-skilled agents undervalue the utility that they get from
spending time with their children.
The rst term on the right hand side of (23) reects the distortion that the tax system
should impose on the labor supply of the low-skilled agents in order to prevent the high-skilled
agents from being tempted to become mimicker and choose the (Y;B)-bundle intended for the
low-skilled. This distortion is related to the assumption that the government cannot observe
\who is who" and it is therefore constrained to design the income tax schedule subject to
a self-selection constraint. The sign of this self-selection term coincides with the sign of the
expression within brackets. In standard models of nonlinear redistributive income taxation,9
a so-called agent-monotonicity assumption is usually invoked for the purpose of signing the
distortion produced by the self-selection term. This assumption requires that, at any given
point in the (Y;B)-space, the higher the wage rate of an agent, the atter the indierence
curves are. Under this assumption the sign of the rst term on the right side of (23) is positive,
therefore calling for a downward distortion on the labor supply of low-skilled agents.10
8 It is important to remember that we have assumed that children must be taken care of all the time, either
by parents themselves or at day care centers. Therefore, if time spent with parents goes up, time spent in day
care centers necessarily goes down. What we are assuming here is that, at the margin and in the neighborhood
of a social optimum, a substitution of time spent with children for time spent in day care centers lowers the
probability that children of low skilled parents become high-skilled adults.
9 See, for example, Stiglitz (1982) or Edwards et al. (1994).
10 Notice however that the conditions required to satisfy the agent-monotonicity assumption are stronger in
our setting than in standard optimal taxation models. In the latter, normality of consumption is a sucient
14Having characterized the optimal distortions imposed by taxation on the labor supply of
the dierent types of agents, we can look at the optimal tax/subsidy on day care expenditures.
Denoting Hicksian demands by a \tilde", the next Proposition provides the main result.














































Proof. See Appendix B.
The denominator of the expression on the right hand side of (24) is negative and it provides
a measure of the deadweight loss generated by distortionary commodity taxation. Thus, the
sign of t is the opposite of the sign of the numerator of the expression on the right side of
(24). The rst term at the numerator depends on the dierence between the amount of day
care services used by a true low-skilled and by a high-skilled mimicker. As we have already
noticed, a mimicker provides a smaller labor supply than a true low-skilled and it is therefore
reasonable to assume that d1
t   b d2
t > 0. Thus, the rst term on the right hand side of (24)
calls for a subsidy on the purchase of day care services. Intuitively, the underlying idea is
that, given that d1
t > b d2
t and starting from a situation where t = 0, it is possible to relax
the binding self-selection constraint by introducing a small subsidy to day care expenditures
while at the same time leaving the utility of all non-mimicking agents unaected by raising
their income tax payments (lowering B1
t and B2
t ) by respectively d1
t and d2
t. To make the
interpretation of the second term appearing at the numerator of (24) easier, it is convenient to
introduce the variable 
j
















t represents the normalized
change, generated by a marginal increase in t, in the compensated demand by agents of skill









































Written in this form, the second term on the right hand side of (25) is reminiscent of a similar
term appearing in (22) and (23). The main dierence is that in (25) we take a sum over
j = 1;2 whereas in both (22) and (23) we only have a type-specic term. The reason for this is
related to the dierent degree of sophistication of the available tax instruments. Labor income
is assumed to be taxable on the basis of a nonlinear schedule. This implies that, subject to
condition for agent-monotonicity. In our setting, this is not enough. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that a
high-skilled mimicker and a true low-skilled agent do not only dier with respect to their labor supply but in
general also with respect to the amount available for private consumption (once expenses on day care services
have been subtracted). See Appendix C for further details.
15a self-selection constraint, the government can oer agents type-specic marginal income tax
rates. Purchases of day care services, on the other hand, are assumed to be taxable only
linearly, meaning that the commodity tax (or subsidy) rate on day care purchases is the same
for all agents, irrespective of the skill type. But for the purpose of letting agents internalize the
social eect of their time spent with their ospring, and also in light of the possibility that the
government wishes to launder the agents' preferences into the social welfare function, dierent
agents would require dierent adjustments in t. Thus, a single tax instrument, t, has to be
tailored in a way that strikes a balance between the adjustment ideally required to correct the
behavior of the low-skilled agents and the one ideally required to correct the behavior of the
high-skilled agents.
Notice that, since 
j
t > 0 for all j but the sign of @j=@n
j
t is assumed to be type-specic,
the direction of the required adjustment in t will be the opposite for high- and low-skilled
agents. Thus, at least for the no-laundering scenario or for small degree of laundering (values
of " which are close to one), the optimal value of t tends to be pushed up by the concern
to aect the allocation of time of high-skilled parents, whereas the concern for aecting the
allocation of time of low-skilled parents would call for subsidizing day care expenditures.
A high value for 
j
t reects a situation where the commodity tax rate is a very eective
instrument to alter the demand for day care services by agents of type j. Because of that,
it is also a very eective instrument to aect the amount of time spent by agents of type j
with their kids. Thus, the optimal value chosen for t will tend to reect more strongly how t
can be used to indirectly aect the time spent with children by parents of skill type j in the
desired direction.11
Having characterized the structure of the optimal mixed tax system, we can notice that
the so called \principle of targeting" fails to hold in this set up. This principle states that a
distortion is best addressed by the instrument that acts directly on the relevant margin.12 In
our setting the time spent by parents with their kids represents a source of ineciency that
requires to be corrected by the public policy. Due to the time constraint faced by agents, the
time spent by parents with their kids determines the amount of day care services that they
demand, and vice versa. Thus, one can also equivalently state that it is the amount of day
care services used by parents that represents a source of externality that calls for a corrective
public intervention. The tax imposed on the purchases of day care services can then be viewed
in our setting as the direct instrument to correct the agents' behavior. Therefore, according to
the principle of targeting, only the tax formula for t should be altered for corrective purposes.
But we can easily check that this is not true in our case. In fact, we can see that the terms
11 Notice that a system often used in practice is to let the tax/subsidy rate on day care expenditures be a
function of the income earned by parents. The reason why we do not consider this possibility here is that, with
respect to the analysis presented above, letting t be a function of Yt would produce only minor dierences.
In particular, the expressions for the optimal marginal eective tax rates faced by the various types of agents






faced by the various
types of agents would not be uniquely dened given that it would always be possible for the government to













12 See Dixit (1985).
16depending on " and t do not vanish from the expressions characterizing the marginal tax
rates for high- and low-skilled agents even after substituting in (45) and (49) the expression
for t provided by (25).
This result is due to the fact that, whereas the required correction to the behavior of high-
and low-skilled parents is dierent, the commodity tax rate t is restricted to be linear and
therefore uniform across types. On the one hand the government would like to distort the
demand for day care services coming from high- and low-skilled parents in dierent ways. On
the other hand, this would require the possibility to impose a nonlinear tax on the consumption
of day care services. However, since agents demand day care services both for time spent
working and for leisure time spent without the kids, the government can use the income tax
as an additional indirect instrument to aect the agents' demand for day care services. More
importantly, the income tax is allowed to be nonlinear and therefore this allows the government
to have dierent agents facing dierent marginal tax rates. Under this respect, the nonlinear
income tax is designed also to serve the role of an (imperfect) substitute for the impossibility
to tax nonlinearly the agents' purchases of day care services.13
We can now turn our attention to the quality of day care services.
4.2 The optimal quality of day care services
Dening by MRS
j;t
ec the marginal rate of substitution between the quality of day care services
and private consumption (keeping xed the consumer price of day care services) for an agent































With the help of (26) Proposition 5 provides a characterization of the optimal quality of day
care services under a mixed tax system.
Proposition 5 Under a mixed tax system the optimal quality of day care services abides by
13 In this section we have maintained the assumption that the purchases of day care services can only be
taxed at a constant rate. A possible alternative would be to allow for a fully nonlinear tax system where also
the purchases of day care services are taxed on a nonlinear scale. Notice that such a system is informationally
dierent from a system where the tax/subsidy rate on day care services is income-dependent. A fully nonlinear
tax system requires the public authority to be able to observe the purchases of day care services at an individual
level; a system where the tax/subsidy rate on day care services is income-dependent only requires the government
to be able to observe earned income at the individual level. In terms of results, the main dierence between a
fully nonlinear tax system and the mixed tax system that we have analyzed in the text would be that, under a
fully nonlinear system, high-skilled agents would face no distortion with respect to the choice between z and c
(i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between z and c would be for them equal to wH
2) whereas the low-skilled
agents' choice between z and c, albeit distorted, would solely be distorted for the purpose of deterring mimicking,





















































































































































Proof. See Appendix B.
Equation (27) can be interpreted as a modied Samuelson-type condition, although it
does not refer to the ecient level of provision of a public good. The term on the left hand
side of equation (27) measures the sum of the agents' marginal willingness to pay for an
increased level of quality of day care services. The rst term on the right hand side of (27)
represents the additional resource cost of raising the quality of day care services, keeping the
consumption of services by agents xed. It is the only term that would remain in a setting
where: i) asymmetric information problems were absent (no self-selection constraints in the
government's problem); ii) the government's objective function were welfaristic, which means
that there is no laundering (" = 1); iii) externalities were absent, in the sense that there is
no need to correct agents' behavior at period t to induce them to internalize the social value
of increasing the proportion of high-skilled agents at period t + 1. Discounting for the fact















t as a rst-best benchmark equating the
sum of marginal benets with the marginal cost of raising quality. Thus, the remaining terms
on the right side of (27) describe how an optimizing policy maker should deviate from the
rst-best rule to take into account self-selection problems, non-welfaristic objective functions
and externalities. One can notice that the presence of the last term on the right side of (27)
does not challenge this interpretation because, as evident from (25), a commodity tax/subsidy
on day care services can only be justied based on self-selection problems, non-welfaristic
objective functions or externalities.
The second term on the right side of (27) reects how the possibility to vary the quality of
day care services can be used for externality-correction purposes and for the potential pursuit
of non-welfaristic objectives. An increase in the quality of day care services exerts both a direct
and an indirect eect on the probability that the child of a type j parent becomes a high-skilled
18adult. The direct eect is due to the fact that the quality of day care services enters as an
argument into the function j. The indirect eect is due to the fact that a change in the quality
level will in general induce parents to modify their decisions on the allocation of time. Both






, which also captures how parents vary the amount
of time spent with their children in response to a variation in disposable income intended to





is therefore in general ambiguous. However, if we make the assumption that the





> 0. Assuming moreover that the degree of laundering of agents' preferences in
the government's objective function is nil or close to zero (" ! 1), we can conclude that the
sign of the second term on the right side of (27) is negative, which pushes for an increase in
the second-best ecient level of day care quality.
The third term on the right side of (27) is a self-selection term that depends on the
dierence between a mimicker's marginal willingness to pay for increased day care quality and
the corresponding marginal willingness to pay for a true low-skilled. If we assume that, having
more time to devote to non-market activities, a mimicker spends more time with his child and
therefore spends less for day care services, the marginal utility of consumption tends to be
lower for a mimicker than for a true low-skilled. Taking this into account, (26) tends to imply
that the marginal willingness to pay for increased quality is larger for a mimicker than for a
true low-skilled.14 In terms of the eects on the rule governing the optimal level of quality
of day care services, this can be interpreted as an increase in the net marginal cost of raising
quality. The underlying intuition is that, as the mimicker's marginal willingness to pay for
quality is larger, a marginal increase in quality, accompanied by a change in the income tax
payment of the low-skilled agent that leaves his utility unaected, would make a mimicker
better o and thus would tighten the self-selection constraint.
Finally, the last term on the right side of (27) provides an account of how government's
(commodity tax) revenues are aected by a change in the agents' consumption pattern when a
compensated increase in day care quality is implemented. Assuming that agents' consumption
of day care services goes up when the quality of services increases, the last term on the right
hand side of (27) raises (resp.: lowers) the net marginal cost of quality whenever the purchase
of day care services is subsidized (resp.: taxed at a positive rate) by the government.
5 Extensions
In this section we briey consider two extensions of our baseline model, focusing on the mixed
tax system case.
14 It is however clear from (26) that one should also consider how the numerator of the expression dening
the marginal willingness to pay for quality diers for a mimicker and a true low-skilled. In our discussion here
we are for simplicity disregarding the possibility that this eect more than osets the eect that works through
the dierence in the denominators.
195.1 Faulty beliefs on 
The rst extension that we consider is obtained assuming that some parents have a faulty
belief about the shape of the function that relates the amount of time they spend with their
ospring with the probability that the ospring will become high-ability adults. For illustrative
purposes, we consider here the case where only low-ability agents have wrong beliefs. Formally,
this means that they take decisions based on the function 1(n1
t), whereas 1(n1
t) is the true
function relating n1
t to the probability that the child will be a high-ability type. Moreover, we
assume that low-ability agents tend to underestimate the negative eect that n1
t has on the
expected human capital of their children. Under the aforementioned assumptions, the design
















































































































To save space, we only consider the eects on the results about the optimal marginal
eective tax rates faced by high- and low-ability agents.
With respect to the former, it is quite easy to realize that the result given by (22) is still
valid. Intuitively, since we have not changed any assumption pertaining to the behavior of the
high-ability agents, the structure of the optimal distortion imposed on them should remain
unaected. With respect to the low-ability agents, instead, the result provided by (23) is no
longer valid. If we were to write the new rst order conditions with respect to Y 1
t and B1
t ,
and follow a similar procedure to the one that led to expression (23) above, it would only be




















































































20Comparing (30) and (23) we immediately see that the only dierence is the presence in the
former of the term labelled  . This term reects the dierence between the warm-glow eect
of a marginal increase in n1
t, as perceived by low-ability parents on the basis of the \wrong"
function 1(), and the warm-glow eect of a marginal increase in n1
t if low-ability parents
were correctly recognizing the shape of the function 1(). A positive (resp.: negative) sign
of   tends to imply that the marginal eective tax rate faced by low-ability agents should be
larger (resp.: smaller) when they misperceive the true shape of the function 1().
Given our assumption that the low-ability agents tend to underestimate the negative eect
that n1
t is going to have on the expected human capital of their children, it is reasonable to
assume that @1=@n1
t > @1=@n1
t. Thus, the sign of the bracketed dierence in   takes a pos-
itive sign, reecting the circumstance that low-ability parents undervalue the true (negative)
marginal warm-glow eect of increasing n1







t =0 < 0,
we can then conclude that the overall sign of   is negative. This result is in accordance with
intuition. The fact that low-ability parents underestimate the negative eect of n1
t tends to
make them spend too much time with their children, at least too much when compared with
the time that would be spent by a utility-maximizing low-ability parent who correctly per-
ceived the shape of 1(n1
t). In this case, a lower marginal eective tax rate represents an
instrument to distort the low-ability agents' behavior in the desired direction, inducing them
to raise labor supply and in this way limiting the total amount of time that they can allocate
between pure leisure and time with children.
5.2 Peer eects
Another possible extension of the model analyzed in Section 4 is to introduce externalities
across peers. Suppose for instance that the expected human capital of a child does not only
depend on his/her parents' time-allocation decisions but also on those of parents of dierent
types. Formally, let the probability for a parent of type j of having a high-human-capital-




t ), rather than by j(n
j
t;Hj;et) as assumed so far. The
externality we have in mind can be described as follows: children of low-ability agents benet
from the interaction in day care centers with children of high-ability agents, meaning that a
prolonged interaction with children of high-ability agents increases their probability of becom-
ing high-human-capital adults. For the sake of argument, we consider that the reverse is true
for children of high-ability agents; namely, a prolonged interaction with children of low-ability
agents in day care centers decreases their probability of becoming high-human-capital adults.











































































































t the externality faced by agents of type j and where we have
added two externality constraints, with associated multipliers 1
t and 2
t, in the Lagrangian of
the government.
If the children of low-ability agents benet from the interaction in day care centers with
children of high-ability agents, and if the reverse is true for children of high-ability agents,
the sign of the multiplier 1
t is positive, since n2
t generates a negative externality on low-
ability agents, whereas the sign of the multiplier 2
t is negative, since n1
t generates a positive
externality on high-ability agents.
What would this imply for the conclusions of our model? Also here, to save space, we
focus on the eects on the marginal eective tax rates faced by the dierent groups of agents.
Solving the model again, we would obtain that the marginal eective tax rates faced by high-































































































From a formal point of view, the only dierence with respect to the corresponding formulas
of Section 4 (eqs. (22) and (23)) is the presence in (31) and (32) of a new Pigouvian term. Given
our assumption that 2
t < 0 < 1
t, the sign of the new Pigouvian term is, in both (31) and (32),
opposite to the sign of the -term, pushing in the direction of lowering the marginal eective
tax rate faced by the high-ability agents and raising the marginal eective tax rate faced by
the low-ability agents. The rst eect is explained by noticing that a reduction in the marginal
eective tax rate faced by the high-ability agents is a way to induce them to internalize the
negative externality that, by spending more time with their own kids, they impose on low-
ability agents: a lower marginal eective tax rate on high-ability agents provides them with an
incentive to work more and thus let their kids spend more time in day care centers. A similar
22reasoning explains why the new Pigouvian term appearing in (32) calls for an increase in the
marginal eective tax rate faced by low-ability agents.
6 Numerical example
In this section we provide a numerical example to illustrate the working of the model without
considering the extensions developed in Section 5. Notice that we do not perform a detailed
calibration on a specic country but we rather elaborate a numerical analysis to understand
the relevance of the mechanisms studied in the theoretical part: how does the presence of a
link between day care arrangements and the distribution of skills aect the optimal policies
chosen by the government? How strong should such a link be, to play a sizable role in the
design of the optimal policies?
To address these issues, we compare two models. In what we call Model 1 day care arrange-
ments have an impact on the distribution of skills: this is the model studied in the previous
sections. The set-up we label Model 2 diers from Model 1 only because day care arrange-




t) = 0 8j. We assume specic parametric
functional forms for the utility function, for the probability of becoming high skilled and for
the relationship between the cost of day care services and their quality. Both for Model 1 and
Model 2, we nd the parameters characterizing these functions using a calibration procedure.
Once we have set these parameters, we compute in both models the optimal policies chosen
by the government: the comparison of the optimal policies across the two models allow us to
isolate the role played by the relationship between day care arrangements and the distribu-
tion of skills, which is the central point of our model. The existence of such a relationship
is supported by the evidence mentioned in Section 1 and thus Model 1 is considered as the
\true" model. Accordingly, the policies computed using Model 1 are denoted as \true optimal
policies" and the policies computed using Model 2 are viewed as \mistaken optimal policies".
Finally, we compute the welfare loss implied by the use in Model 1 of the mistaken optimal
policies instead of the true optimal policies.
The numerical example is performed under the assumption of perfect correlation between
market ability and ability to rear children. We focus our attention on the steady state and
therefore we omit time subscripts. Regarding the scal instruments, we performed the nu-
merical analysis both for the linear tax system described in Section 3 and for the mixed tax
system of Section 4. However, in the presentation of the results, the focus is on the mixed tax
system.15 Moreover, we restrict our attention to the case where there is no laundering of the
warm-glow component of individual preferences.
15 The results for the linear tax system are available upon request.
236.1 Functional forms




+ j logzj + j lognj + 

j(nj)logH2 + (1   j(nj))logH1
; (33)
with  + j + j +  = 1,  > 0, j > 0, j > 0,  > 0 and  < 1. Notice that, as we further
explain in Section 6.2, the parameters for leisure time and for time with children, respectively
j and j, are allowed to be potentially type-specic; moreover we also allow for  6= 0, that
is the utility of consumption can be dierent from the logarithmic one.
The probability of becoming high skilled is:
j(nj) = j + 
xj
1 + xj; (34)
where xj represents the quality of the early childhood environment of an agent of type j and
it is produced combining parental time and day care services using the following constant












with dj =  a   nj.







where 1= is the elasticity of the unitary cost of day care services p with respect to their quality
e (and  is the elasticity of e with respect to p) and ! is a scale parameter. The higher is the
quality of day care services, the higher is their cost.
6.2 Parameterization and Calibration
We interpret each period as having a length of 25 years. We set  a = 0:2, which means that
over a period of 25 years, 5 years are spent receiving child care. In equation (4) we normalize
A to 1.
Allocation of time
We classify as type 1-agents all the individuals with no college degree, while agents of type
2 are those with college education and above. We normalize to 1 the market productivity of
agents of type 1: H1 = 1. We set H2 = 2:3 which is consistent with the data of Restuccia and
Urrutia (2004).
We want to choose the parameters in the utility function (;;j;j;) in order to generate
a realistic allocation of time between labor, parental time with the children and leisure for the
two groups of agents. For this purpose we consider average data coming from the Harmonized
24European Time Use Survey (HETUS).16 Assuming, as it is usually done (e.g. Ragan 2006,
Cardia and Ng 2003, Juster 1985), that non-personal time available for discretionary use
amounts to 100 hours per week, we have: l1 = 30% <l2 = 35%, n1 = 6% <n2 = 7%,
z1 = 64% >z2 = 58%.17 It should be stressed that high-skilled agents devote more time to
their kids, though they also work more (see also Guryan et al. 2008). Notice that in Model
1 the value of  aects the allocation of time since parental time with kids n has an indirect
impact on the utility function through the probability of being a high skilled child j, which is
type-specic. As a consequence we do not need to assume heterogeneous preferences to match
the allocation of time of the two groups and thus we assume j =  and j = . Indeed we have
four parameters (;;;, with  residually determined by the restriction +++ = 1) to
match four target variable (n1;n2;l1;l2 with zj residually determined by the time constraint
(2)). In Model 2, the parameter  does not aect the allocation of time since the probability of
becoming high-skilled j does not depend on parental time n: for this reason we normalize 
to 0. Thus, to match the allocation of time of the two groups we need to allow for dierent j
(and therefore dierent j, with j residually determined by the restrictions +j +j = 1),
in order to have once again four parameters (;;1;2) to match the four target variables
characterizing the allocation of time.
Child care and human capital
As to the parameter , which aects the elasticity of substitution between parental time
and day care services in the production of the quality of the early childhood environment x,
we are aware of the existing estimates referring to the elasticity of substitution between inputs
in the production of the general category of home produced goods. For example, the estimates
of Aguiar and Hurst (2007) would suggest a value of  = 0:6. However, these estimates
refer to a large set of home produced goods rather than to the quality of the early childhood
environment determined by child care. Direct estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
non-parental time and parental time in the production of the quality of the early childhood
environment are not available to the best of our knowledge. The degree of substitutability
between inputs may dier when the focus is not on the general category \home production"
but rather on the output of child care choices. Rogerson (2007), for instance, suggests that in
the latter case the elasticity of substitution may be higher: he uses  = 0:8. We choose the
same value.
As to the elasticity  of the quality of day care services with respect to their cost, there
is no direct evidence (to the best of our knowledge). In our benchmark simulation we choose
 = 0:5. In Appendix D we perform a sensitivity analysis on this parameter.
16 The countries we consider are: Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom. Data refer to
people in the age group 25-50. The period considered is 1999-2004.
17 Two remarks are important in interpreting these data. First, parental time with children is simply dened
as the sum of the minutes registered as devoted to primary and secondary child care: this amount of time is
lower than the total time spent with children and it better captures deliberate child care by parents which is
the focus of this paper. Second, leisure is here dened as a residual category, that is, it is the time not spent
either working or doing primary and secondary child care: as a consequence, it is not a measure of pure leisure
as it also includes, for instance, housework.
25The parameter ! in equation (36) is chosen so that the ratio p=(wH1) between the cost
of day care services and the wage of the unskilled agents is equal to 50%; which is consistent
with the evidence in Blomquist et al. (2010).
The parameters of the probability function (34) 1 and 2 are chosen to match the proba-
bilities of becoming a high-skilled agent: 1 = 0:23, 2 = 0:65 (see Caucutt et al. 2003), which
imply f1 = 0:6 and f2 = 0:4.
In Model 1, the parameter  of the probability function (34) and the quality of day care
services e are chosen to match specic values of the elasticities  j of the probabilities of





choices are  1 =  0:04 and  2 = 0:04, meaning that a 10% increase in the time low (high)
skilled parents devote to their kids reduces (increases) their probability to become high skilled
agents by 0:4% . In Appendix D we perform a sensitivity analysis and consider dierent values
for the elasticities  j.
To put these number on the elasticities  j in perspective, we can refer to the empirical
analysis of Bernal and Keane (2009). In their baseline specication they nd that, on average,
a year of day care translates into a 0:040 to 0:053 year reduction in completed schooling. As
suggested by Bernal and Keane (2009) themselves, it is useful to look at the implication of these
estimates for the rate of change in the proportion of people with a college degree. Assume, as
in our model, that people are of two types, those who nish high school (12 years of education)
and those who nish college (16 years of education), and that 40% of agents nish college.
To increase average completed schooling by 0:040 years, the percentage nishing college must
increase to 41%. Thus, following the empirical evidence of Bernal and Keane (2009), a one year
reduction in the use of day care services implies on average a 2:5% increase in the proportion
of people with a college degree. The values of  1 and  2 we use in our benchmark simulation,
imply that in steady state a one year reduction in the use of day care by both high skilled and
low skilled parents increases the proportion of people with a college degree by 1%.18. Therefore
the strength of the relationship between child care and the distribution of skills implied by
our choice of  1 and  2 does not seem to be too high compared to the available evidence.
Nonetheless, we nd in Section 6.3 that disregarding the eects of parental time on children's
human capital in the design of the optimal policy entails a sizable welfare loss.
The quality of day care services e, determined according to the above procedure, will be
called \calibrated quality". Notice that, when we simulate the optimal taxation problem in
the next section, we allow the social planner to optimally choose a level of quality of day care
services which diers from the calibrated one. Analogously, notice that the above specied
18 In steady state, it is possible to show that the rate of change of the probability of becoming high skilled













25 (recall that we interpret each period in the model as having a
length of 25 years). The chosen value of  







25) decreases the fraction of people with a college degree f
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26values of  j reect assumptions on the current situation and they may have dierent values
once the optimal policies are calculated and implemented.
In Model 2, parental time has no eect on the child's probability of becoming a high skilled
agents, that is  = 0. Moreover, once the cost of producing child care p has been set (see
above), the quality of day care services e does not play any role.
Fiscal variables
As discussed above, the calibration procedure requires that some parameters are chosen in
order to make some variables of the model (namely, those concerning the allocation of time)
equal to their empirically observed counterparts. The individual choices we observe in the
data obviously depend on the tax/transfer scheme which is actually in place. Therefore to
properly perform the calibration of the model we need to make assumptions on the current
scal system.
We approximate the current income tax schedule using the following simple parametric tax
function (see Li and Sarte 2004):
Tj =   (Y j)1+; (37)
with Y j = wHjlj.
We choose  to have an average tax burden (  T = (T1 +T2)=(Y 1 +Y 2)) equal to 35% (see
McDaniel 2007 tax data series). We choose  = 0:6, as in Prescott (2004).
We also have an ad valorem tax on day care, whose rate is d, and an ad valorem tax on
consumption, whose rate is c. We allow the government to also use a lump-sum transfer G.
We set the tax rate on day care d equal to  90% which is consistent with the information
given for Sweden by Blomquist et al. (2010). Finally, we choose the tax rate on consumption
c equal to 25% (see McDaniel 2007 tax data series). The lump-sum transfer is residually
determined in order to a have a balanced government budget.
Notice that the (parametric) scal system described above is just used for the purpose of
calibrating the model: the social planner will choose a fully non linear income tax.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters' values used in the benchmark simulation.
6.3 Simulation: optimal policy and welfare evaluation
Once we have determined the parameters of Model 1 and Model 2 using the procedure described
above, we compute for both models the optimal policies. We focus on the mixed tax system
discussed in Section 4, where the government chooses a potentially nonlinear income tax
schedule and a linear tax on day care. As in Section 4, when determining the optimal scal
policy, the tax rate on consumption c can be normalized to 0. We assume that the discount
rate of the planner  is equal to 0:9.
Table 2 shows the optimal policies. The rst column reports the results of the simulation
performed in Model 1 (where the skills' transmission endogenously depends on the time parents
devote to their kids): in this case the quality is optimally chosen by the government. The










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 2: Optimal policies: benchmark case.
Model 1 Model 2
 T1 -0.397 -0.467







   1 0.019
 1 -0.056 0.000
 2 0.020 0.000
Table 3: Values of the main variables at the optimum: benchmark case.











29skills' transmission is entirely exogenous). In this case the optimal problem of the government
does not concern the choice of the quality of day care services, which is taken as given and
xed at the value found by the calibration procedure described above. The rst eight rows
of the Table report the optimal policy, that is: the average and marginal tax rates on income
 Tj and T0j, the tax rate on day care services d, the marginal eective tax rate METRj
and the optimal value of the quality of day care services e. The existence of a relationship
between the distribution of skills and child care arrangements is supported by the evidence
mentioned in Section 1 and thus Model 1 is considered as the \true" model. Accordingly,
the policies computed using Model 1 are denoted as \true optimal policies" and the policies
computed using Model 2 are viewed as \mistaken optimal policies". The ninth row of Table
2 computes the welfare loss implied by the use in Model 1 of the mistaken optimal policies
instead of the true optimal policies.19 We measure this welfare loss as the percentage increase
in consumption of both types of agents needed to leave social welfare unchanged. In other
terms we compute the factor  which, when multiplied by the consumption of all agents in the
equilibrium allocation where the mistaken optimal policies are used, achieves the same level
of social welfare as under the equilibrium allocation where the true optimal policies are used.
The welfare loss measure is then obtained as    1. Finally, in the last two rows of the Table
we show the values - computed at the optimum - of the elasticities  j of the probabilities
of becoming a high skilled with respect to parental time. Indeed, as explained in Section 4,
the sign of the impact of parental time n on the child's probability j of becoming a high
skilled type has an important eect on the design of the optimal policy as one can appreciate
comparing across Model 1 and Model 2 the results reported in the rest of the Table. In Table
3 we also report for the sake of completeness the values at the optimum of the other main
variables of the model.
To understand why the optimal policy is dierent across Model 1 and Model 2, it is useful
to recall from Section 4 that a distinctive feature of Model 1 is the presence of a type-specic
Pigouvian externality: due to the warm-glow altruism, parents do not fully take into account
the impact of the chosen child care arrangement on the utility of their kids; moreover, such an
impact may be dierent for the high skilled and for the low skilled. As we can see from Table
2, at the optimum  1 < 0 and  2 > 0, meaning that parental time has a negative (positive)
eect on the probability of being high skilled for the kids of the low (high) skilled agents.
Therefore the tax system should induce the low (high) skilled to devote less (more) time to
their kids.
As a consequence the marginal tax rates on income for the low skilled is lower in Model 1
than in Model 2 (2:7% vs. 6:4%). Analogously, the marginal tax rate on income for the high
skilled is higher in Model 1 than in Model 2 (6:7% vs. 0:5%). A similar remark applies to
the marginal eective tax rates on income (see Section 4 for the denition of this measure).
19 We check that the self-selection constraint is veried also when the mistaken policy are used in Model 1.
Notice that when the mistaken policies are implemented in Model 1, the government budget constraint is no
longer satised (the government runs a decit). We allow the government to use a lump-sum tax in order to
keep its budget balanced.
30In particular, notice that METR2 is equal to 0 in Model 2 (the standard no-distortion at the
top result), while it is positive (and equal to 4:8%) in Model 1. METR1 is positive in Model
2 (4:5%) and negative in Model 1 ( 2:9%).
As to the linear tax rate on day care, it has to average the adjustments ideally required to
correct the behavior of the two types of agents. As we can see from Table 3, the ad valorem
tax rate on day care is more negative in Model 1 than in Model 2 ( 41:2% vs.  15:7%),
meaning that the subsidy paid by the government is higher when the link between child care
and child development is considered: the need to encourage the low skilled to use day care
services prevail on the need to increase parental time provided to kids by the high skilled.
Finally, the optimal quality of day care services turn out to be greater than the calibrated
market quality (2:074 vs. 1:715). This implies that the values of  1 and  2 at the optimum
(respectively  0:056 and 0:020) are lower than the values of  1 and  2 assumed in the cal-
ibration procedure ( 0:04 and 0:04). Therefore at the optimum the use of day care services
has a more positive (less negative) eect on children of low (high) skilled parents.
The higher quality of day care services, along with the higher value of the subsidy to day
care, explains why both low skilled parents and high skilled parents use more day care services
in Model 1 than in Model 2 (see Table 3).
Notice that the dierence between the policies computed using Model 1 (the true optimal
policies) and those computed under Model 2 (the mistaken optimal policies) is remarkable.
The welfare loss    1, which gives information on the importance of using the true optimal
policies instead of the mistaken optimal policies, is also sizable. The consumption of all agents
need to be increased by 1:9% in the equilibrium allocation determined by the mistaken optimal
policies in order to achieve the same level of social welfare as under the equilibrium allocation
achieved under the true optimal policies. In Appendix D we perform a sensitivity analysis on
some parameters of the model: we show that the welfare loss may range from 0:2% to 5:7%.
7 Summary and Discussion
This paper has characterized the optimal tax policy and the optimal level of quality of day care
in a OLG model where parental choices over child care arrangements aect in a type-specic
way the probability that a child becomes a high-market-ability adult. Two dierent scenarios
have been considered: rst, one where the government's tax instruments are restricted to be
linear; second, a set-up where labor income is allowed to be taxed nonlinearly. In both cases
we have discussed the rules dictating the optimal choice of day care quality enforced by the
government.
With respect to previous contributions, optimal tax formulas incorporate type-specic
Pigouvian terms which correct for the intergenerational externality in the human capital ac-
cumulation process. We also nd that the so called \principle of targeting" fails to hold in
our setting. It is not just the formula characterizing the tax rate on day care expenditures
that is aected for externality-correcting purposes; all tax formulas are aected. As far as the
31optimal choice of the quality of day care is concerned, this is determined by equating the total
private marginal benets of a quality increase to the marginal cost adjusted for the presence
of three additional terms: the rst one captures the impact on the government's budget con-
straint through the change in demand of consumption and day care services. The second one
reects the intergenerational externality in human capital accumulation. The third one, which
is present only in the mixed tax system, comes from the self-selection constraint.
Finally, to get insights on the practical relevance of the mechanisms investigated in our
theoretical model, we have supplemented our analysis with some numerical simulations. The
results that we have obtained indicate that a public policy that disregards the eects of parental
time on children's human capital entails a welfare loss that ranges from 0:2% to 5:7% of
aggregate consumption.
An assumption that we have maintained throughout the paper is that the government's
objective function is given by the discounted sum of agents' utilities; the only deviation from
a purely utilitarian setting was the possibility to launder, fully or partially, the warm-glow
component of an agent's utility in the social welfare function. This raises the question of how
results would change under a social welfare function where the utility of each type of agents is
weighted by a given welfare weight rather than by the proportion of that type of agents in the
population. To answer this question, suppose that the government assigns a welfare weight i
to agents of type i. Then, the only eect on the tax- and quality-of-day-care-formulas would be





t , wherever they appear. In other words,
dierentiated welfare weights for dierent types of agents would be equivalent, in terms of
the structure of our formulas, to impose type-specic laundering parameters ". In particular,
a relatively large (resp.: small) welfare weight for a given type of agent would have similar




DERIVATION OF (15) AND (16)







































































Using (14) it is immediate to see that (38) can be rewritten as (15).
The rst order conditions with respect to x





















































































Using the Slutsky equation and rearranging terms we can rewrite (39) as (16).
DERIVATION OF (17)



























































































































































with qt  p(et) + d
t indicating the consumer price for one hour of day-care. Using the rst
order condition with respect to d









t denotes aggregate consumption of day care services. We can
therefore rewrite (40) as (17).
Appendix B
DERIVATION OF (22) AND (23)


















































































































































































We can then use (45) to substitute terms in (21) and in this way obtain (22).
34The rst order conditions for Y 1
t and B1





































































































































































































































Using (49) to substitute terms in (21) gives (23).
DERIVATION OF (24)



























































































































































35Multiplying (43) and (47) by respectively d2
t and d1



























































































































































































































































































































































Dening the compensated eect on n
j




















































































Finally, exploiting the time-constraint identity d
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, we obtain (24).
36DERIVATION OF (27)






































































t   p0 (et)t;






























































The term p0 (et)t captures the eects of the increase in the unitary price of day care
services (due to the higher quality level) on the Lagrangian of the government's problem.












, and rearranging terms, allows to rewrite the rst





















































































































t   p0 (et)t: (56)












































































































































































  p0 (et)t: (57)







t . Therefore, dividing by


















































































































































































Using (28) and (29) we can express the condition implicitly dening the optimal level of





















































































Finally, using (26), we can rewrite (58) as (27).
38Appendix C
AGENT-MONOTONICITY ASSUMPTION
Take any given bundle in the (Y;B)-space and consider the marginal rate of substitution









Assuming a utility function of the form u
 
cj;zj;nj
+ j(nj)(H2) + (1   j(nj))(H1),




+ j(nj)(H2) + (1   j(nj))(H1) subject to the budget constraint cj = B  
(p(e) + )dj = B   (p(e) + )
 
lj + zj




and the time con-
straint nj = 1   lj   zj. This implies that @V j=@B = @u
 
;wHj


























































































































Comparing (59) with (60), it is obvious that the rst term on the right hand side of the
latter is smaller than the corresponding term on the right side of the former. This contributes
to make the marginal rate of substitution for the mimicker smaller than the marginal rate of
substitution for a true low-skilled. It is also true, however, that the labor supply provided by a
mimicker is smaller than the labor supply provided by a true low-skilled, which means that a
mimicker has a larger total amount of time to devote to leisure activities. Thus, if a mimicker
spends more time with his kid than a true low-skilled,21 and given that d
j
t = 1   n
j
t, the
expenses for day care services will be smaller for a mimicker than for a true low-skilled. This
in turn means that b c2
t > c1




t (appearing at the denominator


















t < 0, this also
20 We suppress for simplicity the time subscripts.
21 The available evidence seems to support the idea that there is a positive wage elasticity for time spent
with children and a negative wage elasticity for time spent on other leisure activities. See e.g. Kimmel and
Connelly (2007) and Guryan et al. (2008).
39contributes to raise the marginal rate of substitution of the mimicker relatively to that of a











In this Appendix we perform a sensitivity analysis on some parameters of the model, namely
the elasticity  of the quality of day care services with respect to the cost (see equation (36)),
the parameter  (see equation 34) and the calibrated quality of day care services e (see equation
(35)). These parameters are expected to play a role for the results presented in Section 6 but
we do not have compelling evidence on their values.
Table 4 shows the sensitivity analysis on . The higher  is, the higher is the optimal level
of quality of day care chosen in Model 1 and therefore the welfare loss due to the use of the
mistaken optimal policies. We only consider values of  such that the optimal level of quality
chosen by the planner is between the calibrated one (1:715) and the human capital of high
skilled agents H2 (2:3), which we can reasonably view as an upper bound for the quality of day
care services. In particular, when  = 0:38 the optimal level of quality almost coincides with
the calibrated quality: in this case the welfare loss (0:3%) can be still considered remarkable
but it is much smaller than the one reported in Table 2. When  = 0:55; the optimal level of
quality is almost equal to the human capital of the high skilled agents: in this case the welfare
loss is very high (3%).
In Table 4, the parameter  and the calibrated value of the quality of day care services
e are still chosen as in the main text, that is they are set in such a way that  1 =  0:04




j(nj)nj is the elasticity of the probability of becoming a high
skilled with respect to parental time. Tables 5-7 present the results of a sensitivity analysis in
which we choose  and e in order to have dierent values of the elasticities of the probabilities
of becoming high skilled with respect to parental time, while still considering as in Table 4
an interval of values of  such that the optimal quality of day care services is between the
calibrated one and the human capital of the high skilled agents.22
In Tables 5 and 6 we still assume that the eect of parental time on the distribution
of children's skills is of opposite sign for the unskilled and for the skilled. Namely, in the
calibration procedure, we assume  1 =  0:01 and  2 = 0:01 in Table 523 and  1 =  0:07 and
 2 = 0:07 in Table 6.24
22 Notice that the values of  which imply an optimal quality of day care services within this interval dier
according to the values of  and e. Moreover notice that, while the value of the human capital of the high
skilled agents is always assumed to be equal to 2:3, the calibrated value of e may change depending on the
assumptions on  
j.
23 These values of  
j imply that in steady state a one year reduction in the use of day care by both low
(high) skilled parents changes the proportion of people with a college degree by  0:40% (0:64%). The overall
eect of a one year reduction by both types of parents is 0:24%.
24 These values of  
j imply that in steady state a one year reduction in the use of day care by both low (high)
skilled parents changes the proportion of people with a college degree by  2:8% (4:5%). The overall eect of a
one year reduction by both types of parents is 1:7%.
40Table 7 shows the results of the simulation for  1 = 0 and  2 = 0:04,25 that is the time
given by the low skilled has no impact on the distribution of children's skills, while the time
given by the high skilled has still a positive impact.26
All in all, in Tables 5-7, the welfare loss ranges from 0:2% to 5:7% of aggregate consumption.
25 These values of  
j imply that in steady state a one year reduction in the use of day care by both low
(high) skilled parents changes the proportion of people with a college degree by 0 (2:6%). The overall eect of
a one year reduction by both types of parents is 2:6%.
26 We don't report the case where  
1 =  0:05 and  
2 = 0. Indeed it turns out that to have  
2 = 0 we need
to assume a calibrated quality above the level of the human capital of the high skilled H
2, which we view as a
reasonable upper bound for the quality of day care services.
41Table 4: Optimal policies: dierent values of ;  and e set in the calibration procedure in
order to have  1 =  0:04 and  2 = 0:04.
 = 0:38  = 0:55
 T1 -0.398 -0.399







   1 0.003 0.030
 1 -0.034 -0.066
 2 0.027 0.017
42Table 5: Optimal policies: dierent values of ;  and e set in the calibration procedure in
order to have  1 =  0:01 and  2 = 0:01
 = 0:8  = 0:95
 T1 -0.431 -0.423







   1 0.002 0.009
 1 -0.010 -0.021
 2 0.007 0.004
43Table 6: Optimal policies: dierent values of ;  and e set in the calibration procedure in
order to have  1 =  0:07 and  2 = 0:07
 = 0:25  = 0:43
 T1 -0.375 -0.391







   1 0.005 0.057
 1 -0.053 -0.101
 2 0.051 0.029
44Table 7: Optimal policies: dierent values of ;  and e set in the calibration procedure in
order to have  1 = 0 and  2 = 0:04
 = 0:57  = 0:84
 T1 -0.446 -0.440







   1 0.002 0.037
 1 -0.006 -0.063
 2 0.025 0.011
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